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Summary 
We empirically analyze the labor supply choices of married men and women according to their body 
size (BMI), using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics on anthropometric characteristics 
of both spouses, and unmarried men and women as comparison group. Heavier husbands are 
found to work significantly more hours and earn more labor income, controlling for both spouses’ 
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. Conversely, no such effect is found for either 
unmarried individuals or for married women. We suggest a marriage market mechanism through 
which male BMI and earnings are positively related. Heavier married men compensate for their 
negative physical trait by providing their wives with more disposable income, working more hours 
and earning more. Heavier women may not able to compensate their spouse through labor supply, 
as female physical traits are more relevant in the marriage market than the corresponding male 
traits. 
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We empirically analyze the labor supply choices of married men and women according 
to their body size (BMI), using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics on 
anthropometric characteristics of both spouses, and unmarried men and women as 
comparison group. Heavier husbands are found to work significantly more hours and 
earn more labor income, controlling for both spouses’ demographic and socioeconomic 
characteristics. Conversely, no such effect is found for either unmarried individuals or 
for married women. We suggest a marriage market mechanism through which male 
BMI and earnings are positively related. Heavier married men compensate for their 
negative physical trait by providing their wives with more disposable income, working 
more hours and earning more. Heavier women may not able to compensate their spouse 
through labor supply, as female physical traits are more relevant in the marriage market 
than the corresponding male traits. 
 
JEL codes: D1, I1, J1, J22. 









The labor market consequences of obesity and, in general its relationship with income, 
have been widely studied in the literature. We emphasize two strands. First, we find 
many studies looking at the effect of family (household) income on obesity or BMI 
(e.g., Cawley, Moran and Simon, 2008; Schmeiser, 2008; Garcia Villar and Quintana-
Domeque, 2009). Second, there is also a well established literature interested in the 
effect of BMI or obesity on wages and earnings (e.g., Atella, Pace and Vuri, 2008; 
Cawley, 2004; Garcia and Quintana-Domeque, 2006; Han, Norton and Stearns, 2009). 
The main findings appear to be that there is a negative relationship between BMI, wages 
and family (household) income for women, whereas the relationship for men is far from 
being conclusive. Recently, Garcia Villar and Quintana-Domeque (2009) propose a link 
for these two different findings: if there is a wage penalty for heavier women in the 
labor market, this may be reflected in the negative relationship between family 
(household) income and BMI. Decomposing family (household) income into two main 
components, “individual labor income” and “the rest of family (household) income”, 
they confirm such an explanation.     
Weight has also been linked to labor supply, emphasizing time constraints and 
on the job physical activity. Individuals working more hours may have less time to 
exercise, or may work in sedentary jobs, which are likely to be associated with a higher 
body mass index (BMI) (Lakdawalla and Philipson, 2007; Loh, 2009; Ruhm, 2005). At 
the same time, individuals working more hours may consume more highly-caloric food 
to economize on the scarcity of their time, thus increasing their BMI (Chou et al., 2004). 
Unfortunately, neither the literature on income, earnings and BMI, nor the studies on 
BMI and labor supply account for marriage market aspects. 
We examine a marriage market mechanism through which body size (BMI) and 
labor supply and earnings may be positively related for married individuals, 2 
 
investigating the extent to which spouses trade-off anthropometric (BMI) and economic 
characteristics, using income to compensate for their poor physical trait (being heavier, 
i.e., having a high BMI), in an attempt to provide each other with a balanced bundle of 
own body size and income. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID) on heads and wives from 1986 to 2005, and on unmarried male and female 
heads as comparison groups, we focus on the correlation in these anthropometric and 
economic measures of married men and women, controlling for other individual and 
household characteristics.  
We are not aware of any previous study exploring the role of marriage market 
forces and marital status when analyzing the relationship between BMI (obesity), labor 
supply and income or earnings. The importance of our novel approach is twofold: first, 
we explore a potential mechanism between BMI and income that has not yet been 
studied; second, we analyze an additional aspect of the actual marriage market impact 
that body size have on individuals. 
Heavier (or obese) individuals, women in particular, have been found to be 
penalized in the marriage market by matching with partners who are weaker along other 
physical and/or socioeconomic dimensions (Averett, Sikora and Argis, 2008; Oreffice 
and Quintana-Domeque, 2009). Specifically, Oreffice and Quintana-Domeque (2009) 
find that wives’ obesity (body size or weight) measures are negatively correlated with 
their husbands’ income, education and height, controlling for his weight (or body size) 
and her height, along with spouses’ demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. 
Conversely, heavier husbands are not penalized by matching with poorer or shorter 
wives, but only with less educated women.  
In addition to this sorting penalty, there could be a compensation mechanism 
across own individual characteristics, so that a defect is compensated with a quality. 
Everything else being equal, if an individual has a higher BMI, he/she may work and 3 
 
earn more to compensate for the poor physical trait and still match with a decent spouse. 
In this present study, we further explore the role of marriage market penalties focusing 
on the extent to which labor supply can provide individuals with means of 
compensating their obesity with income. We investigate whether this compensation 
exists, estimate its magnitude and assess whether it varies by gender.  
Our empirical analysis reveals that for married men one point increase in 
average BMI is associated with working almost one percent additional hours. For 
earnings, married men are found to respond with a 1.5 percent increase in earnings. No 
significant effects are found either for married women or unmarried men and women. 
Our study sheds some light on the relationship between male BMI, labor supply 
and income. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first analysis to suggest a marriage 
market explanation for the relationship between labor supply and BMI of married men, 
and specifically the first empirical evidence of a positive correlation between hours 
worked and earnings of married men, while no relationship is found for wives, and 
unmarried individuals. Accounting for marital status may be significant in the analysis 
of weight and labor market outcomes. In this perspective, our contribution is 
complementary to this strand of literature, and also to the studies on the marriage 
market effects of weight (e.g., Averett, Sikora and Argis, 2008). 
The findings presented here are consistent with the marriage market reinforcing 
the negative effects of weight by inducing heavier married men to work more hours to 
compensate their spouses for their defect. They also suggest that female physical 
appearance may play a more relevant role both in the marriage and labor markets than 
men’s, as for heavier women it is unfeasible to compensate their spouses with more 
labor supply and earnings, and are instead penalized by matching with husbands of 
lower socio-economic and physical status (Oreffice and Quintana-Domeque, 2009). 
This gender asymmetry may reflect the phenomenon that male physical traits, and 4 
 
weight in particular, are less valuable in the couple than female ones, so that it is 
possible for men to compensate for their lack of physical attractiveness by working 
more hours and thus being endowed with more income. At the same time, as heavier 
men do not appear to be penalized in the labor market (Cawley et al., 2008; Garcia and 
Quintana-Domeque, 2006; Garcia and Quintana-Domeque, 2009; Schmeiser, 2008), 
they actually have the means to provide their spouses with this economic compensation. 
In contrast, for women neither of the above aspects holds. Heavier women are found to 
be penalized in the labor market with lower wages, earnings and overall income, and the 
importance of female body size in the eye of men seems substantial (Averett and 
Korenman, 1996; Braun and Brian, 2006; Carmalt et al., 2008), so that women may not 
have the means to compensate for such a sizable defect, which is in line with our 
empirical evidence.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces/discusses the conceptual 
framework. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the empirical results. 













2. Conceptual Framework 
We develop a simple model of household income (consumption) and work decisions, 
where the couple’s utility depends on the product of the utilities of each spouse. The 
model is presented to explore the role of BMI on the labor supply decisions of married 
couples where both spouses are working. Hence, we directly focus on the interior 
solution of the optimal labor supply choice. 
The couple’s utility   is defined as:   
            (1)
where    and     are spouses’   and   utilities respectively. Each individual   derives 
satisfaction from own consumption, which depends on both own income    and spouse’s 
income    , and from own leisure  1      while derives disutility from the spouse’s 
body size (BMI)   : 
               ,    ,1     ,      (2)
and     is symmetrically defined.    is continuously differentiable with its first partial 
derivatives satisfying the following properties: 
     
   
 0 ,
   
   
 0 ,
   
   
 0  
(3)
Its second partial derivatives satisfy: 
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Its second cross-partial derivatives satisfy: 
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(5)
Note: Perhaps, it would be more realistic to assume that 
    
      
 0 , i.e., the marginal 
utility of leisure decreases with the BMI of the spouse. However, this would reinforce the 
expected positive effect of BMI on hours of work.  6 
 
 
Each spouse   has two sources of income, earnings      and lump-sum income   :  
                  (6)
If  1         is the net amount of individual     own income after transferring 
     to his/her spouse   to compensate for his/her own BMI   , and       is similarly the 
amount received from her spouse  , then 
       ,       1                                  (7)
The maximization problem of couple’s utility faced by each spouse consists of 
deciding the number of hours of work to increase her/his earnings and compensate the 
spouse for the disutility associated to her/his own BMI. The FOC’s for an interior 
solution are given by: 
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(9)
and similarly for  . 
  The effect of own BMI    on hours of work    can be obtained after totally 
differentiating (9) with respect to    and   , to obtain the following expression: 
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 0 . In words, if the marginal increase in utility 
due to an increase in own consumption because of an increase in labor supply is higher 
or equal to the marginal decrease in utility due to an increase in labor supply, the higher 
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Notice that the magnitude of the effect depends, among other things, on both    and 
   
   
.  
•  For high-wage individuals, the effect of BMI on hours of work is smaller.  
•  The higher is the disutility that the individual inflicts to his/her spouse, the 
higher is the effect of BMI on hours of work. However, when 
   
   
   ∞ , the 
required increase in hours of work is too big to be feasible, 
   
   
 ∞ : there is no 
possible compensation.  
 
Results section: Our empirical analysis suggests that the disutility derived by men from 
spousal BMI is much bigger than that derived by women. In particular, we cannot reject 
that 
     
       
   ∞ ,  
       
     
       ∞ , as we do find a positive association 
between BMI and hours worked for men, but not for women: there is no feasible 
compensation that heavier women can make to their spouses.  
 
Note: An easy extension to this model consists in allowing wages to be a direct function 
of BMI,      ), following the literature on the effects of BMI on wages, or to allow for 
labor supply constraints with respect to BMI. However, the results in the robustness 
checks section reject statistical significant relationships between wages and BMI for 





3. Data Description 
Estimation is carried out on data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). 
The PSID is a longitudinal household survey collecting a wide range of individual and 
household demographic, income and labor market variables. Additionally, in the survey 
year 1986, and in all the most recent waves since 1999 (1999, 2001, 2003 and 2005), 
detailed information on weight and height of both heads and wives is available, which 
we use to construct measures of body mass index (BMI) for each spouse or unmarried 
head. The BMI is defined as the ratio of weight in kilograms to height in meters 
squared. Weight and height are originally reported in pounds and inches, respectively, in 
the PSID. 
In the PSID all the variables are reported by the head of the household, including 
the information on the wife. Although it is well-known that self-reported anthropometric 
measures are likely to suffer from measurement error, the error seems to be constant for 
the 25-55 age group according to the analysis in Thomas and Frankenberg (2000) and 
Ezzati et al. (2006). However, notice that in the PSID the household head is reporting 
both his own and his wife’s height and weight. Hence, it may not be appropriate to rely 
on the above measurement error findings. We will discuss the implications of this 
feature in the robustness checks section.       
Our main sample consists of white married couples with wives being between 25 
and 40 years old, the age group for which the effects of physical appearance (proxied 
by body size or weight) on economic outcomes should be more relevant. A couple 
consists of the head and his wife. We include intact couples only if both the head and 
the wife are actually present. In our sample years, all the married heads with spouse 
present are males and the wives are females. We also consider the corresponding 
samples of white unmarried male and female heads as comparison groups. Unmarried 
individuals are those who are divorced, separated, widowed, or have never been 9 
 
married. In our analysis we exclude individuals who are cohabiting. 
We run regressions of male and female labor market outcomes (hours of work, 
earnings and wages) separately by gender and marital status, controlling for individual 
characteristics (and for spousal characteristics too when looking at married individuals). 
Our dependent variables are, specifically, the log of annual hours worked, the log of 
labor income, and the hourly log wage rate.  
The other regressors are age and education of head, and of wife when 
appropriate, education being defined as number of completed years of schooling, and 
top-coded at 17 for some completed graduate work, number of children in the 
household under 18 years of age. In some specifications, log income variables include 
the individual and/or the spouse’s wage rate and household non-labor income. The latter 
is constructed as total family income minus the labor income of each spouse (or of the 
unmarried head). An alternative measure of non-labor income using the spouses’ taxable 
income minus their labor incomes yields comparable estimates. From the health status 
originally recorded by the PSID as a 5-category variable (from excellent to poor health), 
we create a dummy variable for being in good health (1 if excellent, very good, or good; 
0 if fair or poor). We also create dummy variables for occupation categories 
(professional-managerial; service; sales; farmers; crafts; transportation; military). State 
fixed effects are included to capture constant differences in labor and marriage markets 
across geographical areas in the US. 
Our main samples consist of working men and women. We focus on couples 
where both husbands and wives are working because we want to analyze compensation 
effects for body size that arise in terms of labor supply decisions of both husbands and 
wives, and of those who are actually matched to each other, as socioeconomic 
characteristics of each spouse matter. Since our main predictions concern hours worked 
and labor income, at this stage we prefer not to include non-working individuals and 10 
 
labor force participation decisions related to BMI, since we do not wish to confound 
income and compensation effects in our estimation. 
We exclude observations from the top and bottom 1% of the labor income, hours 
and wage distributions. We also discard the couples and individuals with extreme values 
of height and weight following Conley and Glauber (2007) in their analysis using PSID 
data. Thus, we exclude observations where the weight of an individual/spouse is greater 
than 400 pounds or less than 70, and height greater than 84 inches or less than 45 
inches. Finally, household weights are used. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the main variables for husbands, 
wives, unmarried male heads and unmarried female heads. On average, wives are 
younger, less educated, earn lower income and work fewer hours than their spouses. 
Their BMI is lower than their husbands. It is interesting to compare the body size of 
married individuals to unmarried. Unmarried women have a higher BMI than married 
women, while for men the opposite happens, which suggests a marriage market penalty 
for female body size that is not present for men. Unmarried men (women) work fewer 
hours, earn less income and are older than married men (women). 
 











Table 2 presents the results of several regressions where the dependent variable is the 
male log annual hours of work (our measure of labor supply), separately for married and 
unmarried men.  
All the columns show a positive significant correlation between BMI and hours 
worked by married men, whereas for unmarried men the coefficient does not achieve 
statistically significance in any of the regressions. All specifications control for state 
fixed effects, while they differ on the characteristics of the individual and/or of the 
spouse that are included. The first column already shows a significant positive 
correlation between husbands’ BMI and labor supply. Column (2) adds the individual’s 
age, completed education level as well as the number of children in the household. The 
following columns add controls for health, wage and household non-labor income, 
along with the corresponding spousal characteristics. Finally, column (6) refers to the 
specification including occupation dummies as well. Heavier husbands, on average, 
tend to work more hours. Moreover, this correlation persists and exhibits comparable 
magnitudes when accounting for individual and spousal characteristics.  
Husbands’ labor supply is explained mainly by their BMI, which appears to be 
its most significant predictor, and by his wage and household non-labor income. 
Conversely, the labor supply of unmarried men does not exhibit any significant 
relationship with their BMI, and seems to be explained mainly by the individual age, 
education, number of children, and non-labor income.  
 





These results point toward a positive relationship between BMI and labor 
supply, only for married men. This positive significant effect of BMI on hours worked is 
robust and present in all the specifications. Men seem responsive to their BMI and 
willing to alter their labor supply behavior only within marriage.  This could be 
reflecting a compensation mechanism across own individual characteristics, so that a 
defect is compensated with a quality. Everything else being equal, if a male individual is 
heavier (has a higher BMI), he may work more hours and earn more to compensate for 
the poor physical trait and still match with a decent spouse. It seems that heavier 
husbands with higher labor supply can match to wives comparable to those of thinner 
husbands, ceteris paribus.  
The estimates presented so far do not represent yet conclusive evidence of a 
marriage market compensation effect between BMI and income of heavier husbands, as 
higher labor supply does not necessarily mean higher earnings. We now turn to analyze 
how men’s labor income responds to BMI, to test if indeed husbands’ labor supply 
behavior responds to marriage market incentives, as higher disposable income available 












Table 3 presents the corresponding regression results where the dependent 
variable is now male earnings, separately for married and unmarried men. The results 
are qualitatively the same as in the labor supply regressions. Interestingly, the BMI of 
married men exhibits a positive significant impact on their earnings, across all the 
specifications. The number of children is a very strong predictor of male earnings for 
unmarried men. Importantly, there is also a negative significant relationship between the 
wife’s BMI and the husband’s labor income, consistent with the marriage market 
penalties of body size found by Averett, Sikora and Argis (2008) and Oreffice and 
Quintana-Domeque (2009). 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Tables 4 and 5 display the estimates from labor supply (log annual hours of 
work) and earnings regressions for women by marital status.  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
If we compare the female estimates to those for men, the most striking finding is 
that now BMI is not related to either labor supply or earnings. This suggests that either 
male’s preferences for thin women are much stronger than those of women for thin men, 
or that heavier women are subject to labor market constraints which have not been 
accounted for in our theoretical framework. Next section will try to disentangle which 
of these two explanations is more likely.  
 14 
 
We also find that married women with children work fewer hours and earn less 
money, but that this is not the case for those who are unmarried. Also, the wage 
(positive) substitution and the income (negative) effects on hours of work are significant 
for unmarried women, but not for those who are married. Finally, the returns to 
education (in terms of earnings) are very similar for both married and unmarried 
women. 
 
Overall, our findings suggest a potentially new channel through which BMI 
affects income, specifically for men. We show that heavier husbands work more hours 
and earn more income than thinner ones, to compensate their spouse for their poor 
physical trait. No such positive relationship is found for unmarried individuals or for 
wives. This evidence may contribute to a better understanding of the relationship 
between BMI and income, which has been extensively analyzed in the literature for 
both men and women, without reaching a consensus on the actual effects for men (for 
women a negative relationship is found in most studies). Some studies have found a 
positive association between income (earnings) and BMI for men (e.g. Garcia Villar and 
Quintana-Domeque, 2009), and this may be explained by the interaction effects of BMI 
and marital status on earnings, through an increase in labor supply due to a 
compensation mechanism. 
  
Our results are consistent with the male marriage premium literature. Married 
male workers are found to earn more money, by working more hours, being in higher 
paying jobs and having better career paths (Goldin, 1990; Grey, 1997; Korenman and 
Neumark, 1991). Our evidence of a positive significant impact of being married on male 
labor supply and earnings reflects this premium; however, our focus is on the more 
specific role of having a higher BMI as a reason why married men work/earn more, to 15 
 
compensate their spouse for their own defect with better economic standards of living.  
     
We argue that BMI has a positive effect on hours of work for married men, even 
after acknowledging that hours of work may have an effect on BMI, mainly due to time 
constraints (to exercise and to prepare -and eat- healthy food). First, individuals 
working more hours may have less time to exercise, which is likely to be associated 
with having a higher BMI (Loh, 2009; Ruhm, 2005), and this effect may be reinforced 
when working in a sedentary job (when the job is sedentary (or less physically 
demanding), higher labor supply is found to have a positive effect on male weight 
(Lakdawalla and Philipson, 2007)). Second, individuals working more hours may 
consume more highly-caloric food (convenience food, fast food, eating out) to 
economize on the scarcity of their time, thus leading to higher BMI (Chou et al., 2002). 
However, these phenomena should not represent an alternative explanation to our 
findings of a positive significant relationship between marital status, BMI and labor 
supply (earnings) of men. Our evidence of a marriage market compensation for obesity 
shows a positive labor supply effect only for married men, rather than for unmarried 
men as well, and women, which is hard to reconcile with the above reverse causality 
argument, which is in principle gender and marital status neutral, especially when we 
are comparing unmarried with married individuals where both spouses are working. 
Indeed, none of these studies distinguish between differential effects of weight on labor 
supply depending on marital status. More surprisingly, they do not seem to hint to 
marital status being relevant for their analysis of labor supply and weight. In this 
perspective, our contribution is complementary to the literature, suggesting a marriage 
market mechanism through which BMI has a positive effect on labor supply and 
earnings of married men, which has been overlooked so far. 
 16 
 
5. Robustness checks 
5.1. BMI and Wages 
In our conceptual framework we assumed that the wage rate was not a function of BMI, 
which may seem at odds with the empirical evidence documenting a negative 
association between BMI and wages for women, and a sometimes positive one for men. 
We explore the validity of this assumption here. Tables 6 and 7 present a series of wage 
regressions where the dependent variable is the log of hourly wage for men and women, 
respectively, by marital status.  
 
[Table 6 about here] 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
None of the male and female regressions show a significant relationship between 
wages and BMI. This may suggest that it is men’s strong preferences for thin women 
which make it impossible for heavier women to compensate men with higher earnings, 
i.e., 
     
       
   ∞  versus 
       
     
     , rather than labor market constraints faced by 
women themselves. 
 
5.2. Unmarried individuals and “married vs. never married” DID 
Focusing on only never married individuals rather than unmarried (never married, 
divorced, separated, widowed) does not modify our findings. 
Our results are also robust to estimation by means of a difference-in-differences 
approach. Two kind of models were considered: (1) a dummy of marital status (married 
versus never married), BMI, and an interaction between the marital status dummy and 
BMI plus individual characteristics; (2) rather than using a dummy of marital status 
(married versus never married), we replace the dummy by the spouse’s characteristics 17 
 
whenever possible (for never married individuals each of the spouse variable takes the 
value of zero), BMI, and an interaction between the marital status dummy (as defined 
previously in (1)) and BMI plus individual characteristics. The results from both types 
of models (not reported here but available upon request) show a positive statistically 
significant effect of the interaction term only for men: heavier married men work more 
hours. 
 
5.3. Alternative anthropometric measures 
We have focused on BMI as our comprehensive measure of body size and physical 
attractiveness. We can also disentangle the weight component present in the BMI and 
run our regression specifications controlling separately for the two anthropometric traits 
of weight and height. The corresponding estimates yield the same pattern of positive 
significant relationships between weight and hours worked (earnings) of married men, 
while no effects of weight on hours/earnings are found for unmarried men or women. 
 
5.4. Measurement error in BMI 
In principle we can adjust the husband’s self-reported anthropometric variables 
(Cawley, 2004), but it is not clear what we can do with wife’s anthropometric variables 
which are reported by the husband. Perhaps, we can assume that they are measured with 
classical measurement error. This is an issue we are still working on. 
 
5.5. Earlier years 
Our findings are robust to considering earlier years in the PSID sample as our period of 
reference. For instance, samples of married and unmarried men and women in 1986 (the 
earliest survey year in which the information on weight and height was collected in the 
PSID) exhibit the same positive significant relationships between BMI and hours 
worked (earnings) of married men, while no effects of weight on hours/earnings are 
found for unmarried men or women. 18 
 
 
5.6. Sorting and selection into marriage 
Finally, the role of sorting and selection into marriage should be discussed in light of 
our findings. In our current analysis, we do not account for selection bias. However, we 
argue that, if anything, those individuals married to heavier spouses should have a 
lower distaste for their spouse’s BMI. Therefore, if there is such a positive relationship 
between husband’s BMI and earnings, it should be found without accounting for sample 
selection. Our initial guess is that controlling for selection into marital status should 
decrease the effect of BMI on hours of work. To understand why, notice that the average 
BMI is higher for married men than for unmarried men, while it is lower for married 
women than for unmarried women. Given these means, and assuming that own BMI is 
negatively related to distaste for the spouse’s BMI, married men should have a lower 
distaste for heavier women than those who are unmarried, while unmarried women 
should have a lower distaste for heavier men than those who are married. The 
counterfactual marginal disutility should be 
     
       
   ∞ ,  
       
     
     , with   
    . Hence, ceteris paribus accounting for selection into marital status should 













We examine a marriage market mechanism through which body size (BMI) and labor 
supply and earnings may be positively related for married individuals, analyzing the 
extent to which spouses trade-off anthropometric (BMI) and economic characteristics, 
using income to compensate for their poor physical trait (high BMI). We investigate 
whether this compensation exists, estimate its magnitude and assess whether it varies by 
gender. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) on heads and 
wives from 1986 to 2005, and on unmarried male and female heads as comparison 
groups, we find that the marriage market reinforces the negative effects of weight by 
inducing heavier married men to work more hours and earn more income to compensate 
their spouses for their defect. No relationship is found for wives, and unmarried 
individuals.  
These findings represent the first study analyzing the effects of marriage market 
forces on the relationship between BMI, labor supply and earnings. We also highlight an 
additional aspect of the actual marriage market impact that body size have on 
individuals, showing that female weight plays a more relevant role in the marriage 
market than men’s. Indeed, only married men, whose weight is less valuable in the 
couple than the female one, achieve to compensate their spouse by working more and 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics – Means and (Standard Deviations), PSID 
2005. 
          
 Married    Unmarried 
 Husband Wife    Male  Female 
Hours of work (annual)  2,266  1,713    2,000  1,856 
 (579.1)  (717.1)    (677)  (617) 
          
Labor income (annual)  48,414  30,273    38,365  31,630 
 (27,007)  (19,917)   (29,035)  (23,452) 
          
BMI 27.89  25.65    26.86  27.29 
 (4.39)  (6.11)    (4.43)  (6.71) 
          
Age 34.85  32.76    39.93  43.90 
 (6.07)  (4.49)    (13.55)  (14.30) 
          
Education 13.62  14.11    13.54  13.50 
 (2.33)  (2.19)    (2.33)  (2.31) 
        
Children 







      
Good Health  .97  .96    .91  .87 
 (.17)  (.20)    (.29)  (.34) 
          
Hourly wage  21.83  17.87    19.23  16.59 
 (11.64)  (9.91)    (12.38)  (10.47) 
        
Non-labor income 
(annual) 







      
















Table 2: Determinants of male labor supply (log of annual hours of work). PSID 2005. 
            
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 Unmarried Married  Unmarried Married  Unmarried  Married 
BMI –.006  .008***  –.004  .007**  –.004  .007* 
 (.006)  (.003)  (.006)  (.003)  (.006)  (.003) 
Age --  --  –.004**  .001  –.004*  .001 
     (.002)  (.005)  (.002)  (.004) 
Education --  --  .031***  –.007  .029**  –.008 
     (.012)  (.007)  (.012)  (.006) 
Number of Children  --  --  .093***  .004  .099***  .003 
     (.032)  (.011)  (.034)  (.011) 
Good Health  --  --  --  --  .089  .137 
         (.077)  (.115) 
Log(hourly wage)  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
            
Log(non-labor income)  -- -- -- -- --  -- 
            
Wife’s BMI  --  --  --  –.003  --  –.003 
       (.003)   (.003) 
Wife’s Age  --  --  --  .008  --  .008 
       (.005)   (.005) 
Wife’s Education  --  --  --  –.007  --  –.007 
       (.007)   (.007) 
Wife’s Good Health  -- -- -- -- -- .002 
           (.075) 
Wife’s Log(hourly wage)  -- -- -- -- --  -- 
            
Occupation dummies?  NO NO NO NO NO  NO 
Wife’s occupation 
dummies? --  NO  --  NO  --  NO 
R
2 .10  .09  .13  .09  .14  .10 
N 494  783  473  674  473  674 
Note: Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. All regressions include state fixed effects. 

















Table 2 (cont’): Determinants of male labor supply (log of annual hours of work). PSID 
2005.  
            
 (4)  (5)  (6) 
 Unmarried Married  Unmarried Married  Unmarried  Married 
BMI –.004  .007**  –.005  .006*  –.004  .006* 
 (.006)  (.003)  (.006)  (.003)  (.006)  (.003) 
Age –.003*  .001  –.003  .002  –.003  .002 
 (.002)  (.005)  (.002)  (.005)  (.002)  (.005) 
Education .030**  –.004  .031**  –.003  .024*  –.003 
 (.013)  (.007)  (.013)  (.007)  (.014)  (.008) 
Number of Children  .101***  .004  .111***  .004  .119***  .005 
 (.034)  (.010)  (.035)  (.011)  (.036)  (.011) 
Good Health  .089  .139  .094  .135  .097  .131 
 (.076)  (.116)  (.077)  (.116)  (.077)  (.116) 
Log(hourly wage)  –.022  –.055  –.022  –.063*  –.049  –.065* 
 (.042)  (.036)  (.042)  (.036)  (.043)  (.036) 
Log(non-labor income)  --  --  –.012**  –.007*  –.013**  –.008** 
     (.006)  (.004)  (.006)  (.004) 
Wife’s BMI  --  –.004  --  –.004  --  –.004 
   (.003)  (.003)   (.003) 
Wife’s Age  --  .008*  --  .009*  --  .008 
   (.005)  (.005)   (.005) 
Wife’s Education  --  –.006  --  –.006  --  –.015* 
   (.007)  (.007)   (.008) 
Wife’s Good Health  --  .004  --  –.002  --  –.011 
   (.075)  (.007)   (.079) 
Wife’s Log(hourly wage)  --  .008  --  .007  --  .006 
   (.023)  (.024)   (.025) 
Occupation dummies?  NO  NO  NO  NO  YES  YES 
Wife’s occupation 
dummies? --  NO  --  NO  --  YES 
R
2  .14 .10 .15 .11 .18  .14 
N 473  674  471  670  471  670 
Note: Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. All regressions include state fixed effects. 
















Table 3: Determinants of male earnings (log of annual labor income). PSID 2005.  
          
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 Unmarried Married  Unmarried Married  Unmarried  Married 
BMI  –.001  –.001  –.001 .014*** –.001 .013*** 
 (.008)  (.005)  (.008)  (.005)  (.008)  (.005) 
Age  --  --  .002 .008 .003 .009 
     (.003)  (.007)  (.003)  (.007) 
Education  --  --  .087*** .062*** .085*** .061*** 
     (.019)  (.012)  (.019)  (.012) 
Number  of  Children  --  --  .160*** .015 .165*** .013 
     (.062)  (.020)  (.062)  (.020) 
Good Health  --  --  --  --  .086  .178 
         (.121)  (.173) 
Log(non-labor income)  -- -- --  --  --  -- 
          
Wife’s BMI  --  --  --  –.016***  --  –.015*** 
       (.004)    (.004) 
Wife’s Age  --  --  --  .020**  --  .020** 
       (.009)    (.009) 
Wife’s Education  --  --  --  .011  --  .011 
       (.013)    (.013) 
Wife’s Good Health  -- -- --  --  -- .101 
          (.106) 
Occupation dummies?  NO NO NO  NO  NO  NO 
Wife’s occupation 
dummies? --  NO  --  NO  --  NO 
R
2  .12  .09  .18 .25 .19 .25 
N  494  783  473 674 473 674 
Note: Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. All regressions include state fixed effects. 





















Table 3 (cont’): Determinants of male earnings (log of annual labor income). PSID 2005. 
        
 (4)  (5)   
 Unmarried Married  Unmarried Married     
BMI  –.002 .011** –.000 .011**     
  (.008) (.005) (.008) (.005)     
Age  .004 .010 .003 .010     
  (.003) (.007) (.003) (.007)     
Education  .085***  .064*** .048** .055***     
  (.020) (.012) (.023) (.014)     
Number  of  Children  .175*** .014 .199*** .020     
  (.063) (.020) (.066) (.020)     
Good  Health  .092 .164 .082 .182     
 (.120)  (.168)  (.116)  (.167)     
Log(non-labor  income)  –.011 –.021*** –.013 –.021***     
  (.010) (.006) (.010) (.006)     
Wife’s  BMI  -- –.015*** -- –.014***    
   (.004)  (.004)    
Wife’s  Age  -- .022** -- .021**    
   (.009)  (.009)    
Wife’s Education  --  .010  --  –.001     
   (.013)  (.014)    
Wife’s Good Health  --  .079  --  .083     
   (.107)  (.106)    
Occupation dummies?  NO  NO  YES  YES     
Wife’s occupation 
dummies? --  NO  --  YES     
R
2  .19 .27 .26 .29     
N  471 670 471 670     
Note: Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. All regressions include state fixed effects. 





















Table 4: Determinants of female labor supply (log of annual hours of work). PSID 2005. 
          
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 Unmarried Married  Unmarried Married  Unmarried  Married 
BMI  .002  –.003  .003 –.002 .003  .002 
 (.003)  (.006)  (.003)  (.006)  (.003)  (.006) 
Age  --  --  –.004** .006 –.004** .008 
     (.002)  (.011)  (.002)  (.011) 
Education  --  --  .014 –.007 .013 –.010 
     (.008)  (.021)  (.008)  (.021) 
Number  of  Children  --  --  –.024 –.168*** –.025 –.169*** 
     (.020)  (.027)  (.020)  (.027) 
Good Health  --  --  --  --  .004  .079 
         (.060)  (.235) 
Log(hourly wage)  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
          
Log(non-labor income)  -- -- --  --  --  -- 
          
Husband’s BMI  --  --  --  .002  --  .001 
       (.007)    (.007) 
Husband’s Age  --  --  --  –.004  --  –.003 
       (.008)    (.008) 
Husband’s Education  --  --  --  –.020  --  –.021 
       (.018)    (.017) 
Husband’s Good Health  -- -- --  --  -- .457 
          (.198) 
Husband’s Log(hourly wage)  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
          
Occupation dummies?  NO NO NO  NO  NO  NO 
Husband’s occupation 
dummies? --  NO  --  NO  --  NO 
R
2  .07  .09  .09 .15 .09 .17 
N  683  783  652 674 651 674 
Note: Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. All regressions include state fixed effects. Family 

















Table 4 (cont’): Determinants of female labor supply (log of annual hours of work). PSID 2005. 
        
 (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Unmarried Married Unmarried Married Unmarried Married 
BMI  .003 –.000 .002 –.001 .002 –.000 
  (.003) (.006) (.003) (.006) (.003) (.006) 
Age  –.006***  .009 –.004** .010  –.005*** .012 
 (.002)  (.011)  (.002)  (.011) (.002) (.010) 
Education  –.003  –.013 .006 –.016 .001 –.035 
  (.009) (.023) (.009) (.021) (.009) (.026) 
Number  of  Children  –.029  –.164*** .003 –.166***  –.009 –.173*** 
  (.020) (.027) (.021) (.027) (.022) (.098) 
Good  Health  –.008 .085 –.024 .081 –.022 .131 
  (.060) (.231) (.059) (.231) (.058) (.227) 
Log(hourly  wage)  .203*** .074 .183*** .087 .145*** .031 
  (.043) (.075) (.041) (.076) (.045) (.081) 
Log(non-labor  income)  --  --  –.025*** –.006 –.023*** –.007 
     (.005)  (.008)  (.005)  (.008) 
Husband’s  BMI  -- .002 -- .001 -- –.000 
   (.007)  (.007)  (.007) 
Husband’s  Age  -- –.001 -- –.001 -- –.003 
   (.007)  (.007)  (.007) 
Husband’s  Education  -- –.009 -- –.023 -- –.001 
   (.017)  (.017)  (.019) 
Husband’s Good Health  --  .452**  --  –.439**  --  –.403** 
   (.200)  (.202)  (.197) 
Husband’s Log(hourly wage)  --  –.202***  --  –.214***  --  –.200*** 
   (.071)  (.074)  (.073) 
Occupation  dummies?  NO NO NO NO  YES  YES 
Husband’s occupation 
dummies?  -- NO -- NO -- YES 
R
2  .15 .18 .19 .17 .23 .23 
N  651 674 651 670 651 670 
Note: Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. All regressions include state fixed effects. Family 

















Table 5: Determinants of female earnings (log of annual labor income). PSID 2005.  
          
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 Unmarried Married  Unmarried Married  Unmarried  Married 
BMI  .003  –.016**  .003 –.007 .003  .000 
 (.006)  (.008)  (.006)  (.008)  (.006)  (.007) 
Age  --  --  .003 .020 .003 .023 
     (.003)  (.013)  (.003)  (.013) 
Education  --  --  .094*** .085*** .092*** .080*** 
     (.014)  (.026)  (.014)  (.025) 
Number  of  Children  --  --  –.001 –.203*** –.003 –.205*** 
     (.032)  (.033)  (.032)  (.033) 
Good Health  --  --  --  --  .064  .112 
         (.108)  (.271) 
Log(non-labor income)  -- -- --  --  --  -- 
          
Husband’s BMI  --  --  --  .008  --  .006 
       (.010)    (.009) 
Husband’s Age  --  --  --  –.005  --  –.003 
       (.009)    (.009) 
Husband’s Education  --  --  --  .006  --  .006 
       (.022)    (.021) 
Husband’s Good Health  -- -- --  --  --  .804*** 
          (.217) 
Occupation dummies?  NO NO NO  NO  NO  NO 
Husband’s occupation 
dummies? --  NO  --  NO  --  NO 
R
2  .11  .10  .19 .20 .19 .23 
N  683  783  652 674 651 674 
Note: Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. All regressions include state fixed effects. Family 





















Table 5 (cont’): Determinants of female earnings (log of annual labor income). PSID 2005. 
        
 (4)  (5)   
 Unmarried Married  Unmarried Married     
BMI  .002 –.000 .000  .001     
  (.006) (.007) (.005) (.007)     
Age .006**  .022*  .004  .029**     
 (.003)  (.013)  (.003)  (.011)     
Education  .105*** .083*** .044***  .041     
  (.014) (.025) (.014) (.030)     
Number  of  Children  .053 –.205*** .030 –.209***     
  (.036) (.033) (.035) (.033)     
Good  Health  .034 .109 .014 .192     
  (.102) (.272) (.091) (.270)     
Log(non-labor  income)  –.044*** –.014 –.034*** –.013     
  (.009) (.010) (.008) (.010)     
Husband’s  BMI  -- .005 -- .001    
   (.009)  (.009)    
Husband’s  Age  -- –.001 -- –.006    
   (.009)  (.009)    
Husband’s  Education  -- .004 -- .006    
   (.022)  (.024)    
Husband’s  Good  Health  -- .785*** -- .674***    
   (.219)  (.199)    
Occupation dummies?  NO  NO  YES  YES     
Husband’s occupation 
dummies? --  NO  --  YES     
R
2  .23 .23 .37 .30     
N  651 670 651 670     
Note: Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. All regressions include state fixed effects. Family 




















Table 6: Determinants of male’s hourly wage (log of hourly wage). PSID 2005.  
         
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 Unmarried Married  Unmarried Married  Unmarried  Married 
BMI  .003  –.000    .003 –.001 .004  .001 
  (.008) (.004) (.008) (.004) (.008)  (.004) 
Age .006***  .014***  .006***  .014*** .006***  .014*** 
  (.002) (.003) (.002) (.003) (.002)  (.003) 
Education .055***  .086***  .055***  .085*** .026  .075*** 
  (.015) (.008) (.015) (.008) (.016)  (.011) 
Number  of  Children  .066 .004 .066 .004 .084  .006 
  (.056) (.017) (.057) (.017) (.055)  (.017) 
Good  Health  --  --  –.003 .065 –.017  .065 
      (.108) (.120) (.107)  (.114) 
         
Occupation  dummies? NO NO NO NO  YES YES 
R
2  .20 .28 .20 .28 .25  .30 
N  473 722 473 722 473  722 
Note: Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. All regressions include state fixed effects. 





Table 7: Determinants of female’s hourly wage (log of hourly wage). PSID 2005.  
         
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 Unmarried Married  Unmarried Married  Unmarried  Married 
BMI .000  –.005    .001  –.002  –.001  –.004 
  (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)  (.004) 
Age .007***  .013***  .008***  .014*** .007***  .016*** 
  (.002) (.005) (.002) (.005) (.002)  (.005) 
Education .080***  .111***  .079  .108*** .034***  .093*** 
  (.011) (.012) (.011) (.011) (.011)  (.012) 
Number  of  Children  .023 –.038* .022 –.038* .021  –.032 
  (.024) (.021) (.024) (.021) (.022)  (.020) 
Good Health  --  --  .060  .328*** .037  .307*** 
      (.081) (.107) (.069)  (.108) 
         
Occupation  dummies? NO NO NO NO  YES YES 
R
2  .26 .29 .26 .30 .41  .33 
N  652 694 651 694 651  694 
Note: Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. All regressions include state fixed effects. 
Family weights are used. *** (**) [*] Statistical significance at the 1% (5%) [10%].
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